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ABSTRACT
Objective: To explore what Australian experts value in
breast screening, how these values are conceptualised
and prioritised, and how they inform experts’ reasoning
and judgement about the Australian breast-screening
programme.
Design: Qualitative study based on interviews with
experts.
Participants: 33 experts, including clinicians,
programme managers, policymakers, advocates and
researchers selected for their recognisable influence in
the Australian breast-screening setting.
Setting: Australian breast-screening policy, practice
and research settings.
Results: Experts expressed 2 types of values: ethical
values (about what was good, important or right) and
epistemological values (about how evidence should be
created and used). Ethical values included delivering
benefit, avoiding harm, promoting autonomy, fairness,
cost effectiveness, accountability, professionalism and
transparency. Epistemological values informed experts’
arguments about prioritising and evaluating evidence
methodology, source population and professional
interests. Some values were conceptualised differently
by experts: for example, delivering benefit could mean
reducing breast cancer mortality, reducing all-cause
mortality, reducing mortality in younger women,
reducing need for aggressive treatment, and/or
reassuring women they were cancer free. When values
came into conflict, experts prioritised them differently:
for example, when experts perceived a conflict between
delivering benefits and promoting autonomy, there
were differences in which value was prioritised. We
explain the complexity of the relationship between held
values and experts’ overall views on breast cancer
screening.
Conclusions: Experts’ positions in breast screening
are influenced by evidence and a wide range of ethical
and epistemological values. We conclude that
discussions about values should be a regular part of
breast-screening review in order to build understanding
between those who hold different positions, and
provide a mechanism for responding to these
differences.
INTRODUCTION
Mammographic breast screening was ﬁrst per-
formed in the mid-20th century and became
widespread in the 1980s. Public and profes-
sional debate about mammography screening
began immediately,1–3 and intensiﬁed after
publication of controversial meta-analyses of
breast screening randomised controlled trials
that suggested lower beneﬁts than originally
calculated4–6 and signiﬁcant overdiagnosis.7–9
(Throughout this paper, we use overdiagnosis
to mean: diagnosis of non-progressive or
slowly progressive breast cancer through
screening, a diagnosis that does not produce
a net beneﬁt for the women diagnosed. We
use the term overtreatment to mean the treat-
ment of overdiganosed cancers, treatment
which is, by deﬁnition, unnecessary10–12). It
was widely hoped13 that the recently updated
review of the evidence by Marmot et al14
would put an end to the controversy, but dis-
agreements between experts about breast
screening persist, particularly around the
amount of beneﬁt and the risk of overdiagno-
sis.15 Such disagreements can be a challenge
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first application of empirical ethics to
breast-screening policy and practice outside of
consumer studies.
▪ The study has a wide reach, using data from a
broad selection of key players in breast screening
and covering all important stakeholder groups
across the country.
▪ The rich data set and detailed analysis provides a
comprehensive picture of how values guide think-
ing and influence experts’ opinions on mammo-
graphic screening.
▪ Experts in other jurisdictions, with different organ-
isational structures and different societal values,
may express different views. However, since the
Australian programme shares much in terms of
rationale, purpose and implementation with coun-
terpart programmes in the UK and many European
countries, it seems likely that our results will be at
least partially transferable to these contexts.
▪ There may have been differences between experts
who agreed to participate and those who did not.
However, we purposely interviewed experts from a
range of backgrounds and public opinions about
breast cancer screening.
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for policy and practice, particularly if they persist and
seem intractable. Relatively little is known about how
breast screening experts develop different interpretations
of the evidence on the beneﬁts and harms of breast
cancer screening. There have been a number of sugges-
tions. Some attribute the differences to variable epi-
demiological understanding of potential biases.12 16 17
Others acknowledge the possible effect of professional
bias or vested interests,6 12 17–19 or differing historically
based assumptions about the biology or inevitability of
cancer growth.20 While these are all potentially relevant,
it is likely that there are also deeper differences under-
lying the variation in experts’ positions: that is, these
experts may have different ideas about what is important
and what matters with regard to breast screening21 22
and/or the evaluation of evidence.6 Well-meaning,
thoughtful and epidemiologically competent experts may
hold a range of views and ideas about breast cancer
screening owing to differences in how they prioritise
certain values or principles.
Values are integral to public health programme plan-
ning and are emphasised in the aims of many national
breast-screening programmes including those of the
UK,23 Australia24 and many European countries,25 which
refer to concepts such as delivering beneﬁt, avoiding
harm, accountability and recently, transparency and
respect for autonomy. Many authors also see values as
being important in the creation and interpretation of evi-
dence.26 27 Our commitment to different values may be
expressed overtly, via debates and discussions about these
values; but debates around such issues are rare in the lit-
erature on breast screening. This sidesteps important
conversations about what is important and gives limited
acknowledgement to the role of these values in determin-
ing breast-screening policy and practice decisions.
The idea that values are important in healthcare is not
new. There has been considerable interest in paying
attention to: patients’ values in clinical practice28 and
health technology assessment;29–31 citizens’ values in
healthcare policy;32 33 and health practitioners’ values in
clinical practice.34 35 This way of looking at healthcare
not only assumes the importance of values in health-
care,36 but also accepts a plurality of values among differ-
ent stakeholders, and emphasises the need to explore
and work through values’ differences during healthcare
decision-making.35 With these ideas in mind, we aimed to
investigate experts’ values in breast screening, with a view
to identifying new means by which persistent disagree-
ments in this ﬁeld might be understood or mitigated.
This study is part of a larger Australian National
Health and Medical Research Council-funded project
examining ethics and evidence in cancer screening. In
this paper, we report on one component of a substudy
focused on ethics and evidence in screening for breast
cancer. Our aim in this paper is to empirically examine
the values or principles that Australian experts employ
when evaluating the Australian breast cancer screening
programme.37 We reasoned that by developing a clearer
understanding of the values employed by these experts,
we could move towards a better understanding of the
debate about this changing and sometimes difﬁcult
topic. We focused on experts because (1) they are well-
informed relative to the general population of citizens,
policymakers or researchers; (2) disagreement between
experts has been a central feature of breast screening, so
mapping experts’ values should assist in understanding
this disagreement and (3) these experts have inﬂuenced
breast-screening policy and practice, both directly
through decision-making bodies, and indirectly by inﬂu-
encing consumer groups and other policymakers.
Our research questions were:
▸ What are the values expressed in the talk of Australian
experts about breast screening in Australia?
▸ What are the implications for policy and practice of
experts holding particular values?
METHOD
Methodology
This study employed a qualitative methodology, with
sampling, data collection and analysis strategies designed
to best answer our research questions.38 We used open
qualitative methods because there was little pre-existing
knowledge about the topic and because we sought to
access the values of participants on their own terms. We
were motivated by our commitment to empirical bioeth-
ics, in particular to the view that practice and theory
must exist in a symbiotic relationship, where each has
the potential to alter the other.39 40 We undertook this
study in that spirit, expecting that existing ethical theory
would inform our analysis, but also that our data and
analysis could make a useful contribution to ethical the-
orising in the area of breast screening. We have consid-
erable experience and knowledge of grounded theory
methodology, which informed our study design,41 42 but
this was not strictly a ‘grounded theory study’.43 44
Participants and sampling
We selected participants from the population of ‘inﬂu-
ential experts’, individuals who had engaged in frequent
media commentary, publications, senior administration
or management, advice to government or professional
committees, or senior advocacy on breast screening. We
sampled purposively for maximum variation45 of ideas,
deliberately inviting participants with strongly divergent
opinions (table 1). We also reasoned that perspectives
may be associated with professional responsibilities and
experiences, so contacted participants with a range of
professional roles.
We identiﬁed potential interviewees by scanning aca-
demic and popular media publications on breast screen-
ing, and personnel lists on websites of organisations
involved in breast screening. We also followed up on sug-
gestions from colleagues and previously interviewed
experts. As experts, all participants were able to be
contacted via information in the public domain.
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We approached 46 experts via email, and interviewed 33
(17 male and 16 female). Thirteen people either refused
(3), or were unable to participate (1), or did not respond
to emails (9). We had a particularly low response rate
from volunteers who were on public record as holding
senior roles in consumer advocacy organisations. This
may have been due to a higher turnover of people in
these positions than in other professional roles: they may
no longer have been working as advocates when we sent
our email. Our sampling evolved as analysis progressed,
ensuring that we had enough representation of positions
and roles to give us conﬁdence in our ﬁndings.41 We con-
tinued to sample until we reached thematic saturation.38
Data collection
LP conducted semistructured interviews face to face in the
expert’s or LP’s workplace, or by telephone, if unavailable
to meet in person, from October 2012 to October 2013.
Interviews lasted 39–105 min (average 66 min). In keeping
with reports from the literature, we found that face-to-face
and telephone interviews were of comparable quality and
length.46 Utilising telephone interviews enabled us to
interview experts across the country.
Interviews were designed to elicit experts’ views and
opinions on breast screening in Australia. LP described
her interest in the topic as a medical practitioner under-
taking doctoral studies in cancer-screening ethics. She
noted aloud that there was an obvious range of opinions
among experts despite, and often about, the large
evidence base, and suggested that she was interested in
exploring this further. The aim of the interviews was
to ensure that participants could speak freely without
experiencing any judgement regarding their views.
We did not ask direct questions about abstract values or
principles, instead we asked about interviewees’ experi-
ence of the breast-screening programme and their views
on what was good or bad and why (see online supple-
mentary appendix). Interviews were digitally recorded,
transcribed by a professional service, and de-identiﬁed.
Analysis
Analysis focused on developing a set of categories that
captured the most important values in experts’ talk. Our
goal was not to develop a theory, but to identify mid-
range ethical concepts being used by participants, and
understand what those concepts meant in use.
Interviews were read repeatedly and coded in detail to
capture values-in-use. From codes, more abstract categor-
ies were developed; these evolved iteratively as the data
collection and analysis progressed. LP wrote analytic
memos throughout, and shared these with other authors
for discussion. Coding, categorisation and memo writing
were closely informed by Charmaz’s iteration of the con-
stant comparative method.41
All participants gave individual written or verbal
consent, were assured of conﬁdentiality, and were free to
withdraw from the study at any stage.
RESULTS
Experts disagreed as to whether, or to what degree,
values influenced their thinking
Although all experts discussed value-laden concepts in
relation to breast screening, they varied in how much
Table 1 Characteristics of experts
Participants 33 (brackets contain number of experts who were invited but did not participate; 13)
Professional role*
Clinicians† 15 (3) Oncologists 3 (1)
Surgeons 4 (0)
Breast physicians 1 (2)
Radiologists 2 (0)
Radiation oncologists 2 (0)
Pathologists 3 (0)
Not otherwise specified 0 (1)
Non-clinical researchers 14 (3) Epidemiologists/biostatisticians 9 (1)
Not otherwise specified [NOS] 5 (1)
Administrators/managers Administrators/ managers 6 (2)
Advocacy leaders 6 (7) Consumers working in advocacy 3 (6)
Clinicians/researchers working in advocacy 3 (1)
Public stance on breast screening‡
Supportive 16 (9)
Mostly supportive§ 3 (1)
Critical 6 (0)
Unknown to researchers 8 (3)
*Note that some experts held more than one professional role.
†Most clinicians engaged in research to a greater or lesser extent.
‡We loosely categorised potential interviewees as being ‘supportive’, ‘mostly supportive’ or ‘critical’ about breast screening based on publicly
available commentary.
§Broadly supportive of breast screening but with selected concerns about one or more elements of the programme.
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they considered values to be important in shaping their
opinions. Many experts suggested that values inﬂuenced
their thinking, volunteering that “ideology” (#15 epi-
demiologist), “values” (#17 researcher, not otherwise
speciﬁed (NOS)) or “judgements” (#13 consumer advo-
cate), as well as evidence, inﬂuenced how they and
others formed opinions about breast screening. Others
denied the inﬂuence of values, contrasting value-based
reasoning (characterised by use of “intuition, judge-
ment, political trickery, [and attending to] those with
the loudest voice” (#29 epidemiologist) against scientiﬁc
reasoning (in which, ‘the ﬁgures cannot lie’ #21 epi-
demiologist). For these experts, using values meant
being biased or unscientiﬁc, and as such, should be
avoided: “I’m a scientist, I look at the available evidence
and I try and evaluate that impartially” (#9 oncologist).
A single expert presented a unique argument against
using values when reasoning about breast screening.
Using values, they argued, required deep, philosophical
reﬂection. They saw themselves as a person of action
rather than reﬂection, which meant values thinking was
not relevant to them. This view suggested that values
thinking was only for philosophers or academics, not for
practitioners, and implied that practitioners could main-
tain a value-free position.
Experts invoked ethical and epistemological values in
their talk
At the most abstract level, experts’ value-talk about
breast screening could be categorised into two main
groups: ethical and epistemological (table 2). Ethical
values related to ideas about the right thing to do:
There [is] disagreement amongst experts about what we
should do. Even if you had a room full of people agree-
ing on the evidence, you would still get different ideas
about screening. I think it’s values … that is responsible
for those differences. (#17 researcher NOS)
Epistemological values related to preferred sources of
knowledge, including the nature of evidence-based
reasoning:
Table 2 Experts’ views on values that are important in breast cancer screening
Ethical values The range of meanings-in-use of this value* (common conceptions of values are in italics)
Delivering benefits† Breast cancer-related benefits (mortality: reducing population breast cancer mortality; reducing
breast cancer mortality in non-elderly women. Morbidity: enabling less aggressive treatments;
providing reassurance; reducing population burden of disease—incidence of total/advanced
breast cancer)
Non-breast cancer-related benefits (reducing all-cause mortality; improving health for communities
with the poorest health outcomes)
Avoiding harms† Low overdiagnosis rate; low false positive rate; minimal overtreatment; minimal pain and
inconvenience; low false negative rate (false reassurance)
Respecting autonomy† Providing information; facilitating informed choice; providing screening to women in the target age
range; providing screening upon request for older women beyond the target age; maximising
breast screening participation so that women will have the knowledge to make decisions about
their future
Equity Providing equal access to breast screening; contributing to equal health outcomes for all
Economic efficiency Cost effective relative to other health interventions; minimising inefficiencies
Accountability Regular audit and evaluation
Professionalism Performing well at required tasks of job; providing individualised and patient-centred care to
consumers
Fair process for policy
decision-making
Including all stakeholders; excluding those with possible vested interests; asking public opinion on
worthiness of breast screening; asking public opinion about breast-screening policy if the
scientific evidence is uncertain
Transparency Ensuring that underlying values that guide breast-screening policy are clear to consumers
Epistemological values The range of meanings-in-use of this value
Evidence-based
knowledge†
Randomised controlled trial evidence; all relevant scientific studies; scientific studies that have
been rigorously analysed for bias; preference for local and recent service studies; must include
evidence about harms; avoiding modelling studies; including modelling studies; evidence as
evaluated by expert methodologists; evidence as evaluated by impartial scientists without vested
interests; including studies of ‘uninformed’ consumer opinions; excluding studies of ‘uninformed’
consumer opinions
Other knowledge sources Clinical experience; logical reasoning; personal stories; government endorsement; include those
with extreme opinions; assume truth is in the middle
*Some experts may use more than one meaning simultaneously.
†Most commonly discussed values.
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What … people do with the same evidence and the same
statistics is, in the main part, ideologically driven...I don’t
think that anything is value-free—[that] any scientiﬁc
statement is particularly value-free. (#15 epidemiologist)
As shown in table 2, the range of ethical values discussed
by experts related to familiar concepts from the literature,
including the inﬂuential Four Principles47 of clinical medi-
cine (delivering beneﬁt, avoiding harm, respecting auton-
omy, supporting justice), as well as principles more
commonly endorsed in public health practice or public
health ethics (economic efﬁciency, accountability and fair
and/or transparent decision-making processes). Experts
also valued professionalism.
A range of epistemological values was also expressed
(table 2), with experts describing ways of thinking about
knowledge, including views on constructing or reviewing
the scientiﬁc evidence base and uses of non-evidence-
based knowledge.48
Experts had different interpretations of value-related
concepts
Although experts’ value talk reﬂected familiar ethical
and epistemological concerns, our central ﬁnding is this:
there was substantial variation in the way experts con-
ceived of each value. This is consistent with the litera-
ture, which acknowledges and discusses such distinctions
and complexities.35 The range of ways that experts con-
ceive of each value is shown in table 2. The most com-
monly discussed values were also the most variably
constructed: we discuss this in detail below.
Delivering benefits
Experts’ conceptions of delivering beneﬁt in breast screen-
ing fell into two main categories: breast cancer-speciﬁc
and non-breast cancer-speciﬁc outcomes. All experts
talked about breast cancer-speciﬁc beneﬁts, including
reduced population breast cancer mortality and morbidity.
Morbidity was mostly discussed in terms of enabling less
aggressive treatment and reducing population breast
cancer burden. Two experts (both consumer advocates)
also included breast cancer-related reassurance:
Some of that beneﬁt might be just peace of mind, the
fact that you don’t, as far as they can tell, have breast
cancer. (#24 consumer advocate)
Most experts suggested that breast screening delivered
modest to substantial population mortality beneﬁts. Many
also saw the breast cancer morbidity beneﬁts of screening
as substantial, but others saw them as being absent.
Participants’ conception of morbidity appeared to
inform their perception of the presence or absence of
this beneﬁt. When participants said, ‘screening offers
morbidity beneﬁts’ they usually meant ‘screening reduces
the treatment needed, or provides reassurance’. When
participants said, ‘screening does not offer morbidity
beneﬁt’ they usually meant, ‘screening does not decrease
the burden of breast cancer illness in populations’ (gen-
erally because of the impact of overdiagnosis).
A small group of experts argued that breast screening
did not deliver beneﬁts. When they argued this, they
used a broader, non-breast cancer-speciﬁc concept of
beneﬁts, and meant either that screening did not
reduce all-cause mortality, or that screening did not
assist the communities with the poorest health out-
comes. These experts were concerned that the high cost
and attention paid to breast screening meant that other,
possibly more worthy, public health programmes were
not implemented, meaning that the important public
health beneﬁt of improving health outcomes for the
most needy was not realised.
Avoiding harms
Experts’ described (avoiding) harm in a variety of ways
(table 2), with two main patterns and a third minor
pattern emerging. One group of experts, comprised
mostly of researchers, conceived of harm as being
mainly about overdiagnosis. A second group, mostly clin-
icians, saw signiﬁcant harms in false-positive diagnoses
and/or overtreatment. Not all researchers or clinicians
expressed a clear conception of harm, and of those that
did, not all described it along these lines. However,
these two major patterns were associated with particular
professional roles, suggesting some inﬂuence of availabil-
ity bias.49 Researchers whose work involved calculating
overdiagnosis in populations tended to conceptualise
harm as overdiagnosis. By contrast, clinicians working
with identiﬁable patients receiving false-positive results
and negotiating between appropriate treatment and
overtreatment, tended to see harm in these terms.
A third, less widely expressed view about harms concen-
trated on women’s experience of the screening process.
This view was held by all three consumer advocates and
one researcher, who described harm in terms of minor
physical discomfort and inconvenience, and denied that
overdiagnosis or false positives caused harm:
Women aren’t being harmed by breast screening and
society isn’t being harmed by breast screening. It’s … a
little mindset that has developed. (#13 consumer
advocate)
As with beneﬁts, we saw correlations between experts’
concepts of harm and ideas about levels of harm. Those
who viewed harm as overdiagnosis perceived harms as
more extensive than those who viewed harm as false
positives, overtreatment, or unpleasant experiences.
Respecting autonomy
Experts expressed differing versions of what respecting
autonomy means in breast screening. The dominant view
was that respecting autonomy is about providing compre-
hensive information to women who are offered breast
screening. A less common view, described by a smaller
number of experts, including all three consumer
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advocates, placed respecting autonomy as being about
the provision and promotion of breast screening, as this
enabled women to “ﬁnd out whether you have [a cancer]
or not” (#24 consumer advocate) early enough to enable
less aggressive treatments. For these experts, information
was less central to autonomy than the option/encourage-
ment to screen. They advocated limiting information in
order to avoid scaring women away.
Epistemological values
Most experts viewed the scientiﬁc evidence as the most
important source of knowledge about breast cancer
screening. There was a wide spread of ideas, however,
about what constitutes ‘good’ scientiﬁc evidence
(table 2), and this spread was evident across the subgroup
of epidemiologists and biostatisticians. For example,
some epidemiologists said it was important to consider all
studies, others preferred only top-quality studies, some
prioritised recent, local service studies, and there were
differing opinions about mathematical models. Several
experts emphasised their own studies when discussing
examples of evidence that they used and trusted.
A smaller number of experts described their lack of
understanding of the scientiﬁc evidence on breast
screening. Some explained that they still viewed this evi-
dence as important and relied on the interpretation of
trusted colleagues or opinion leaders. Others, including
two who openly stated that they did not trust the scien-
tiﬁc evidence, described additional or different sources
of knowledge (table 2) including: “intuitive interpret-
ation based on what has changed in breast screening
over 30 years … [and] common sense” (#23 surgeon).
We did not ﬁnd a clear pattern linking experts’ epis-
temological values and their overall opinion about
breast screening, and could not predict, from expressed
epistemological values, whether experts would be sup-
portive or critical of breast screening.
Experts’ awareness about different interpretations
Some experts were aware of variations in how values
were conceived, occasionally referring to an alternative
conception to their own, mainly in order to reject it.
Discussion of such differences was not common,
however, most experts expressed values implicitly rather
than explicitly, and did not explore alternative meanings
of the values they were using. This opens the possibility
that experts may sometimes be speaking at cross-
purposes about what is important in breast screening,
despite using similar terminology.
Conflicting values
Many experts described a perceived conﬂict between one
or more values in the breast-screening context. They saw
certain values as being in tension with each other, such
that respecting one value would necessarily entail sacri-
ﬁcing the other. Most experts who discussed conﬂicting
values described tensions between respecting autonomy
and delivering beneﬁt. These experts equated respecting
autonomy with providing information, and felt that pro-
viding information to consumers might reduce participa-
tion rates and, therefore, lower breast cancer mortality
and morbidity beneﬁts of screening. Some experts simply
described a spectrum of positions that one could take
regarding these conﬂicting values, such as ‘the con-
tinuum between individual autonomy and public health’
(#17 researcher NOS). Others openly favoured one value
over another, with implications for practice. Those who
prioritised delivering beneﬁts, for example, preferred to
limit breast-screening information in order to avoid frigh-
tening women away. Those who prioritised autonomy
were in favour of providing more comprehensive infor-
mation and encouraging informed choice.
A smaller number of experts discussed conﬂicting
values in terms of avoiding harms and delivering bene-
ﬁts. Their view about the relative importance of these
two values had practical implications for whether or not
they supported breast screening: those who prioritised
avoiding harm were less likely to support screening than
those who prioritised delivering beneﬁts. Experts’ con-
ceptions of harm were also important, however, and
box 1 describes several examples of ways in which the
combination of experts’ conception and prioritisation of
‘avoiding harm’ might affect their level of support for
breast screening.
As reported, experts rarely discussed alternative con-
ceptions of a particular value different to their own. By
contrast, experts frequently referred to alternative ways
other experts might prioritise values. Several experts
agreed that an important step towards resolving conﬂict
in breast screening was to seek consensus on which
values to prioritise.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that experts’ positions in breast screen-
ing are inﬂuenced by more than just the evidence50;
they are also inﬂuenced by a wide range of ethical and
epistemological values. We have demonstrated consider-
able variation in how experts conceive of individual
values, and how they prioritise certain values over
others. These differences, together with a lack of knowl-
edge about how one might, or whether one should,
engage in explicit values-based discussions, suggests a
vast potential for fundamental disagreement about
screening policies and programmes.
Disagreements in breast screening have persisted
despite multiple meta-analyses of the breast-screening
evidence, including the recent Independent Review led
by Marmot.14 This review made a vital contribution, pro-
viding a highly regarded consensus on quantiﬁcation of
mortality reduction and overdiagnosis. Its publication
was, however, immediately followed by disputes about
both the conclusions and their implications for policy
and practice.15 We noted earlier that differences of
opinion of this sort are often attributed to the correct-
ness or incorrectness of evidence interpretations,12 16 17
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but our ﬁndings suggest that evidence interpretations
may also be related to variations in epistemological
values. Other authors attribute disagreements to vested
interests.6 12 17–19 Although we did not explore experts’
ﬁnancial or commercial interests in this study, many par-
ticipants had direct clinical and/or research interests in
breast screening. Their familiarity with and trust in their
own work may have led them to ignore or discount evi-
dence that presented an alternative view. More signiﬁ-
cantly, our study suggests another, potentially more
subtle set of reasons to explain differing opinions:
experts may hold quite different values, or different ver-
sions of the same values. Even epidemiologically compe-
tent and non-conﬂicted experts may disagree about
breast cancer screening because of deep value commit-
ments. They may be working from very different under-
standings of what is good or bad about breast screening,
what its goals should be, and what matters.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of this study are its empirical nature and
the completeness of its reach. This is, to the best of our
knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical ethics study with breast-
screening policymakers and practitioners. We were able
to interview a wide selection of key players in breast
screening in Australia, and so could provide a compre-
hensive picture of experts’ values and reasoning. Possible
limitations include the focus on Australia, as experts from
other jurisdictions may hold different values. However,
since the Australian programme shares much in terms of
rationale, purpose and implementation with counterpart
programmes in the UK and many European countries, it
seems likely that our results will be at least partially trans-
ferable. Note, that we were not seeking to demonstrate
the prevalence of particular values (which would require
a survey in a population-based sample), rather, we aimed
to capture the range and variety of values. By continuing
our sampling and analysis until we reached thematic sat-
uration we are conﬁdent that we have achieved this
aim.38 Finally, it is possible that experts who agreed to
take part were somehow different from those who did
not, however, we sought to minimise such potential bias
by ensuring that we interviewed experts from a range of
backgrounds and professed opinions about screening.
Implications for practice, policy and research
Our ﬁndings have strong implications for practice and
policy, as both the way experts conceive of values, and the
types of values they prioritise, directly inﬂuence the posi-
tions they take regarding breast screening. The current
situation where values are rarely explicitly considered or
discussed is not ideal. We do not presume that all experts
should adhere to one set of ‘correct’ public health values,
or even that such a thing exists. Rather we argue for a
closer, more explicit examination of the values underpin-
ning breast-screening service provision and policy by indi-
vidual experts, in expert decision-making bodies, and in
the public domain.51 52 Our ﬁndings highlight several
issues suitable for speciﬁc examination by breast-screening
decision-makers, the public and researchers (box 2).
If stakeholders are able to be more transparent about
values, this may enable people with seemingly divergent
positions to recognise points of agreement, or at least
improve their understanding of why others think the way
they do, helping to build bridges between opposing
viewpoints. It should also assist with the justiﬁcation of
breast-screening policy, and wider debate about concord-
ance or discordance between the values of inﬂuential
experts and the considered judgements of the commu-
nity.39 53 Empirical investigation of citizens’ values
regarding breast screening was beyond the scope of this
project, but is an important issue for future research.
Broad engagement regarding what is important to
experts and citizens (eg, by using a citizen’s jury
model32) could support the development of an explicit
framework of values to guide future decision-making on
breast screening.54 This would not be straightforward:
the plurality and apparent incommensurability of values
in communities is well recognised, such that it may be
best not to expect or force a consensus, but rather to
focus on the fairness of the decision-making process.55
Regardless, Weed56 reminds us that more engagement
with and knowledge about ethics and values has a ten-
dency to lead to more ethically appropriate decisions,
and that this is a worthy aim in provision of healthcare
and public health services.
Box 1 Conception of values and prioritisation of values
influences experts’ opinions on breast screening
The following three case study examples from the data illustrate
how experts’ conception and prioritisation of ‘avoiding harm’ can
influence their opinions on breast screening.
Expert A (#21 epidemiologist) saw breast-screening harm in
terms of overdiagnosis and considered these harms to be sub-
stantial. This expert saw both avoiding harms and delivering ben-
efits as being important, but because harms were, in their view,
so large, was not supportive of the breast-screening programme.
Expert B (#10 epidemiologist) saw breast-screening harms as
being limited to those inconveniences that women experienced as
a result of attending screening services: thus, they were seen as
very minor. Thus, although this expert believed strongly that
avoiding harms should take priority over delivering benefits in the
context of public health programmes in general, the harms from
breast screening were, in their view, so negligible they were
strongly supportive of breast screening.
Expert C (#9 oncologist) saw breast-screening harm in terms of
overdiagnosis. This expert was uncertain as to the level of over-
diagnosis harm: “you don’t know how much to worry about that”
but assumed it was, “probably lower that in some of the other
screening programs.” They thought delivering benefits should
take priority over avoiding harms: “[Some] professionals may put
a higher weight and value on ‘first do no harm’. It’s a point of
view. It’s not my point of view.” Their overall opinion was, like
Expert B but via a very different route, highly supportive of breast
screening.
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Engagement with values in breast screening—or any
other area of health intervention—cannot be a once-only
activity, as values change over time in expert and lay com-
munities. For example, since organised breast screening
began, consumer leaﬂets have become increasingly
detailed and information rich, reﬂecting the generally
increasing value given to promoting the autonomy of
healthcare consumers.57 Changes in epistemological
values have also occurred, including the introduction of
evidence-based medicine,58 changed thinking about
study quality,59 and the growing attention to impartial
reviews by independent experts.13 14 Growing evidence
about overdiagnosis has changed the way we think about
and prioritise the value of avoiding harm. Research about
values, and processes to incorporate values in policy
setting and decision-making, will need to evolve and con-
tinue to reﬂect this ongoing change. Debates around
ethical and epistemological values should sit alongside
the regular discussions of evidence, as part of ongoing
processes for planning the future of breast screening.
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